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PRIVITY AS A FACTOR IN ACTIONS FOR
PERSONAL INJURIES IN NEW YORK'
ARON STRUER
THE purpose of this article is to indicate the direction in which
personal injury actions in New York are proceeding and to demon-
strate the legal steps involved. In the course of that demonstration
one of the principal factors will be seen to be the removal of the re-
strictions enforced by the necessity for privity. The plan, therefore,
is to define privity as the term is to be used, to show how it has been
applied and where it has been discarded and to present the resultant
picture with an eye to ultimate effects.
Privity is one of those legal terms sufficiently recondite to escape
general use but lacking that narrow definition which characterizes a
scientific term. Such popularity as the word enjoys stems from the
phrase "privity of contract", meaning the relationship that exists be-
tween parties to a contract. For this reason the word is not usual
in negligence actions. To appreciate its proper connotation a very
brief history of the origin of negligence actions is necessary.
I. THE ORIGIN OF NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
THE recovery of damages for injuries inflicted negligently was
not one of the earlier forms of action known to the English com-
mon law. The first essays to recover were clothed in the terms of more
familiar forms, especially assault,' contract and the equity action to
ARON S UER is a Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, First
judicial District.
1 This is the fourth of a series of studies in personal injury cases in New York.
The first, The Conception of Duty, appeared in 18 Cornell L. Q. 51 (1932); the second,
The Action for Wrongful Death, in 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 388 (1935); the third,
The Fellow Servant Role, in 6 Fordham L. Rev. 361 (1937).
2 Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928), traces
this connection. Assault may be the grounds for a negligence action as where defend-
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restrain a private nuisance. As far as the relationship to assault
was concerned, no questions of privity were presented. But where
the right to recover was phrased in terms of contract, the same ques-
tions as to whether the parties were in privity were presented just
as if it were a contract action. And in the nuisance cases the related
question, whether the plaintiff was one of the persons who had a right
to complain of the nuisance, arose. By the time New York began to
have a law of its own, it was recognized that there was a right to
recover for injuries inflicted through negligence, but in the absence
of statutory requirements there had to be some contractual relation-
ship between the parties. Most of the problems of privity are the
heritage of this history. It should be emphasized, however, that an
action for injuries, though derived from contract in some instances,
is not a contract action.3 As will be seen in several situations, it has
been repeatedly pointed out that in the contracts concerned damages
for personal injury were not in the contemplation of the parties.4
In addition, privity is used in another context-relationship to
the accident. This reference is to situations where the defendant was
negligent, but the issue is whether his negligence was the source of
plaintiff's injuries. A number of other artful phrases have been ap-
plied to this situation-"proximate cause" and "reasonably foresee-
able consequence" are among those more commonly employed. As
will be shown, there are few legal issues whose determination suffers
more from the lack of a scientific vocabulary. Whether or not privity
is the proper word to use in connection with these cases, will be
discussed below.
Lastly, privity has been used in the cases where the plaintiff
is not the person injured-actions for wrongful death, for loss of
ant is under a duty to protect plaintiff. This is sometimes mistakenly described as an
assault action. Ussop v. West African Lines, Inc., 151 Misc. 12, 269 N. Y. Supp. 654
(City Ct., N. Y. Co., 1934).
3 Conversely, a breach of contract without negligence cannot be the basis of a
tort action. Lichenstein v. Augusta-Aiken R. & Elec. Co., 165 App. Div. 270, 150
N. Y. Supp. 992 (1st Dept. 1914).
4 The question of the effect of the form of the action where recovery for injuries
is involved has been most successfully treated by allowing the action in the other form
(contract, etc.) and limiting the damage to the measure usual in such cases. Conklin
v. Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N. Y. Supp. 529 (1st Dept. 1930). Generally, if
there is an impediment to the negligence action the suit is held barred. Schmidt v.
Merchant's Despatch Trans. Co., 244 App. Div. 606, 280 N. Y. Supp. 836 (4th Dept.
1935); Monohan v. Devinney, 131 Misc. 248, 225 N. Y. Supp. 601 (Sup. Ct., Albany
Co., 1927).
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services and on subrogated claims. It is doubtful whether this use
of the word is anything more than an attempt to secure variety of
expression.
This last group of cases arose in the early days of the action
for wrongful death when such preliminary but basic questions as the
nature of the action-whether personal or proprietary, whether trans-
itory or local, and the like-were threshed out. There was also ex-
tensive litigation depending on the distinctions and resemblances of
this action with that for loss of services and the consequences.' It
is not because these questions are now determined6 but because this
brief exposition shows that no real question of privity is presented
that discussion of them is not in order.
II. TYPES OF CONTRACT ASSOCIATED WITH CLAIMS
FOR INJURY
THERE are two types of contract which have been generally asso-
ciated with claims for injury, contracts for transportation and con-
tracts for sales of merchandise.
A. TRANSPORTATION CAss.-In the transportation cases there
is privity where the plaintiff is a passenger. If someone else paid his
fare, there is at least a contract made for his benefit and under fa-
miliar principles there was no difficulty.'
Then with a little trouble there was included employees of third
persons carried free under contracts with their employers. Then it
5 These propositions were all discussed in the Action for Wrongful Death, supra.
The following are key cases on the subject: Dickens v. New York Cent. R. R., 23
N. Y. 158, 1 Abb. Dec. 504, 1 Keyes 23 (1861); Green v. Hudson River R. R., 31
Barb. 260 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., Onondaga Co., 1859); Hoes v. Third Avenue R. R., 5 App.
Div. 151, 39 N. Y. Supp. 40 (1st Dept. 1896); Tilley v. The Hudson River R. R.,
24 N. Y. 471 (1862); Drake v. Gilmore, et al., 52 N. Y. 389 (1873); Hegenrich v.
Keddie, 99 N. Y. 258, 1 N. E. 787 (ls85); Matter of Meekin v. B. H. R. R., 164
N. Y. 145, 58 N. E. 50 (1900); Matter of De Garmo, 86 Hun 390 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.,
1895).
6 Perhaps legal questions are never finally determined. The ones mentioned enjoyed
a brief renaissance upon the adoption of the New York Municipal Court Code. Its
provisions for jurisdiction provided a further opportunity for dispute. Lyons v. New
York City R. Co., 49 Misc. 517, 97 N. Y. Supp. 1033 (Sup. Ct., 1906); Rosenfeld v.
Morales, 112 N. Y. S. 2d 211 (Mun. Ct., City N. Y., 1952).
7 Glenn v. Winters, 17 Misc. 597, 40 N. Y. Supp. 659 (Sup. Ct., 1896).
s Blair v. Erie Ry. Co., 66 N. Y. 313 (1876).
9 Fox v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 67 App. Div. 460, 73 N. Y. Supp. 896 (1st Dept.
1902); Foreman v. New York City Ry. Co., 54 Misc. 557, 104 N. Y. Supp. 932 (Sup.
Ct., 1907); Ryan v. M. R. Co., 121 N. Y. 126, 23 N. E. 1131 (1890); Brady v. M. R.
Co., 127 N. Y. 46, 27 N. E. 368 (1891); Fox v. Mayor, etc, of New York; 5 App.
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was natural to include as among those in privity persons about to
become passengers, so that the rights of the man getting on the
streetcar became indistinguishable from those of the man getting
off.' And then the man waiting to get on was included.10 And lia-
bility began with the approaches to the station" and continued till the
passenger was well off the platform.12 All of these rules are natural,
simple and involve no conflict. But when the liability to a third per-
son, not in any sense a passenger, is involved, a real problem is pre-
sented. This does not mean that if a train negligently runs over
someone, there is no basis for liability.13 But if the claimed negli-
gence is the failure to use the same degree of care required for a
passenger, there is a question. Suppose the train was managed ex-
pertly but could not be stopped. If it had had the latest types of
Div. 349, 70 Hun 181 (Ist Dept. 1896); Timpson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 49 Hun 607,
1 N. Y. Supp. 673 (1st Dept. 1888); Rogers v. New York & Brooklyn Bridge, 11
App. Div. 141, 42 N. Y. Supp. 1046 (2d Dept. 1896); lorlo v. Murray, 256 App.
Div. 512, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 492 (1st Dept. 1939); Kellegher v. Forty Second St. R. Co.,
56 App. Div. 322, 67 N. Y. Supp. 767 (1st Dept. 1900); Irwin v. Metropolitan St. Ry.,
25 Misc. 187, 54 N. Y. Supp. 195 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. Co., 1898).
10 Boyce v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 118 N. Y. 314, 23 N. E. 304 (1890). As to him
the inclination to find liability is not so strong. While it is not so expressed, that seems
to be the result. Girvin v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. R., 52 App. Div. 562, 65 N. Y. Supp.
299 (4th Dept. 1900); Mitchel v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354
(1896), reversing 4 Misc. 575, 77 Hun 607 (N. Y. 1893); Tod v. Interborough Rapid
Transit, 129 Misc. 156, 220 N. Y. Supp. 174 (Mun. Ct., City of N. Y., 1927). In one
case recovery was denied because it was held the employee was acting beyond the scope
of his authority; in another because the injury was not the subject of damages. It is
doubtful if these reasons would have prevailed against passengers.
11 Tod v. Interborough Rapid Transit, 129 Misc. 156, 220 N. Y. Supp. 174 (Mun.
Ct., City of N. Y., 1927).
12 Green v. Middlesex Valley R. R., 31 App. Div. 412, 53 N. Y. Supp. 500 (4th
Dept. 1898); Wolf v. Brooklyn: Ferry Co., 54 App. Div. 67, 66 N. Y. Supp. 298 (2d
Dept. 1900); Hancock v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. R., 100 App. Div. 161, 91 N. Y.
Supp. 601 (4th Dept. 1905). Of course, in all of these situations the carrier is not an
insurer; it just owes a duty of care which the passenger can enforce. Truesdell v.
Erie R. R., 114 App. Div. 34, 99 N. Y. Supp. 694 (1st Dept. 1906) ; Woolsey v. Brook-
lyn Heights R. R., 123 App. Div. 631, 108 N. Y. Supp. 16 (2d Dept. 1908); Smith v.
Brooklyn Heights R. R., 129 App. Div. 635, 114 N. Y. Supp. 62 (2d Dept. 1908); Dunn
v. Murray, 166 Misc. 294, 1 N. Y. S. 2d 708 (City Ct., N. Y. Co., 1937). And con-
tributory negligence is a factor. Fogassi v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. R., 13 Misc. 102, 34
N. Y. Supp. 116 (C. P., N. Y. Co., 1895).
13 As in all vehicular accidents-if the place is public there can be no question of
privity. Thomson v. Seaman, 67 App. Div. 58, 73 N. Y. Supp. 488 (1st Dept. 1901).
A railroad crossing is public. Ernst v. Hudson River R. R., 35 N. Y. 9 (1866). If a
railroad property protects its crossing one going on the tracks despite that cannot
recover. Hatch v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R. Co., 156 App. Div. 394, 141
N. Y. Supp. 1005 (4th Dept. 1913), 159 App. Div. 596, 145 N. Y. Supp. 781 (4th
Dept. 1913). The tracks at other places do not have to be guarded. Petur v. Erie
R. R., 151 App. Div. 578, 136 N. Y. Supp. 79 (2d Dept. 1912).
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brakes, it could have been. What rights has the third person, or more
likely in the case supposed, what rights have his heirs? A passenger
has the right to have the road, in addition to providing him with a
place to ride,14 use the best equipment known.' Now the railroads
owe no such duty to their employees.1" Therefore it must be obvious
that the obligation to the passenger rests on an implied term in the
contract of carriage. How does an outsider get the benefit of this
contract? In the first place, it must be admitted that he does.17
This is patently illogical. It represents a divergence in the pat-
tern of the law. Deduction would require the opposite conclusion.
But whether any harm is done depends entirely on where one's sym-
pathies lie in the situation. The carrier already has the onus of pro-
curing such equipment and no additional burden is put upon it. But
it is not only in regard to equipment that the ancient concepts of
privity have been abandoned. On crossings where the conduct of the
railway has been prescribed by statute, the person crossing is in
privity but his rights are to have the statutory provisions obeyed.
That would be what his privity entitled him to. Actually the duty to
him exceeds that and negligence can be found even though the regu-
14 Willis v. Long Island R. R., 34 N. Y. 670, 32 Barb. 398 (1866); Ginna v.
Second Avenue Railroad Co., 67 N. Y. 596 (1876). After considerable litigation it
was finally determined that it was not contributory negligence to ride on the plat-
form of a street car. Nolan v. Brooklyn City & N. R. R., 87 N. Y. 63 (1881).
15 Costello v. The Syracuse etc. R. R., 65 Barb. 92 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1873); Burke
v. Manhattan R. Co., 13 Daly 75 (N. Y. C. P., 1885); Weitzman v. Nassau Elec.
R. R., 33 App. Div. 585, 53 N. Y. Supp. 905 (2d Dept. 1898). The test is whethhr
other roads have successfully used the device plaintiff claims would have avoided the
accident. Wynn v. Central Park N. & E. R. R., 133 N. Y. 575, 30 N. E. 721 (1892),
reversing 10 App. Div. 13, 41 N. Y. Supp. 595 (1st Dept. 1896). The phrasing of the
main rule has caused infinite trouble. It is said that a railroad owes a passenger "the
highest degree of care." It does as regards equipment. As to operation its duty is
to use reasonable care. O'Brien v. New York Railways Co., 185 App. Div. 867, 174
N. Y. Supp. 116 (1st Dept. 1919). But attempts to have the equipment rule applied
to running the cars have been many.
16 Selters v. President of Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 5 T. & C. 559 (N. Y.
Sup. Ct. 1874); Healy v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Ry., 111 App. Div. 618,
97 N. Y. Supp. 801 (4th Dept. 1906); De Graaf v. New York & Hudson River R. R.,
3 T. & C. 255 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1874). Despite this undisputed rule it has been held
that a landlord owes a greater duty to a janitor while in an apartment supplied him
than he does to a tenant. Anderson v. Steinrich, 32 Misc. 680, 66 N. Y. Supp 498
(Sup. Ct., N. Y. Co., 1900).
17 Boehncke v. Brooklyn City R. R., 3 Misc. 49, 22 N. Y. Supp. 712 (City Ct.,
Brooklyn, 1893); Wynn v. Central Park R. R., 10 App. Div. 13, 41 N. Y. Supp. 595
(1st Dept. 1896); McNair v. Manhattan Ry., 46 Hun 502 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1887). Sub-
ject to the same test as to what improvements are required, as has been noted, that
applies to passengers. Wiedmer v. N. Y. E. R. R., 114 N. Y. 462, 21 N. E. 1041
(1889).
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lations have been complied with.' So here there is an additional
burden, but actually it only serves to supplement the statutory duties
to provide that the performance of those duties has the effect in-
tended by the statutes. So that in the transportation cases it is seen
that while the removal of requirements of privity as a condition for
suit does not require the carriers to do anything they were not already
obligated to do, it does make them liable to people to whom they
would otherwise not have to respond.
B. SALES CAsEs.-In the sales cases the distinctions between
those where the parties are in privity and where they are not is easily
and distinctly drawn. A buyer and a seller are in privity. But a
manufacturer who sells to a retailer is not in privity with the ulti-
mate consumer. Where there is privity and injury results from the
condition of the thing sold, there is little difficulty.19 By analogy
with the contract situation there is a warranty of fitness or suita-
bility. The warranty is not exactly the commercial warranty-it is
that the article has no defect or foreign substance in it that a reason-
able inspection will reveal-which will cause injury.20 The distinc-
tion is a practical one. It is virtually impossible to hold a storekeeper
liable for a defect in a product sold in a sealed container. So the war-
ranty was held not to require an inspection involving opening the
container.21 This is a limitation or restriction beyond what the con-
tractual situation would require. And in situations in stores not
amounting to sales, as where a customer with permission exam-
ines goods on display, there is no warranty and no right to re-
cover in negligence for a defect in the article.22 Yet one in the busi-
ness.of leasing personalty has been held to make the same warranty
18 Zimmer v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 7 Hun 552 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1876).
19 Garvey v. Namm, 136 App. Div. 815, 121 N. Y. Supp. 442 (2d Dept. 1910);
Santise v. Martins, Inc., 258 App. Div. 663, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 741 (2d Dept. 1940); Price
v. Ganun, 11 Misc. 74, 32 N. Y. Supp. 801 (Super. Ct., 1895), aff'd, 155 N. Y. 670,
49 N. E. 1103 (1898).
20 Higgbloom v. John Wanamaker, New York, 178 Misc. 792, 36 N. Y. Supp. 777
(Sup. Ct., N. Y. Co., 1942).
21 Hopkins v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 265 App. Div. 278, 38 N. Y. S. 2d 788
(1st Dept. 1942).
22 Guttman v. Woolworth Co., 159 Misc. 821, 288 N. Y. Supp. 819 (Mun. Ct.,
N. Y. Co., 1936). The decision is correct though the reasoning was faulty. It was that
as customers had -the privilege of taking things off the shelf and replacing them, the
seller was not on notice of the defect. In the same situation if one of the replaced ar-
ticles falls off the shelf and hits a customer the seller is liable. Robinson v. Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co., 184 Misc. 571, 54 N. Y. S. 2d 42 (Sup. Ct.,.N, Y. Co., 1945). So the
reasoning in the text would be a better ground of decision.
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as a retailer.23 As warranties are limited to sales transactions, this
is really peculiar from a standpoint of legal reasoning.
C. LIABILITY OF RETAILERS AND MANUFACTURS.---There are
some retailers whose activity is largely governed by statute. It is well
to note one of these for the light thrown on the non-privity cases. A
pharmacist is often in the position of a manufacturing retailer. It is
in accord with all principles that he should be liable for his careless
errors.24 But in addition where the transaction is in a drug which is
a poison, he is obliged to make inquiries which are designed to make
sure that the customer understands what he is receiving. 5 All prac-
ticable safeguards are placed around the transactions.26
In view of this, it is significant that the first case to break
through the barriers of privity involved poison. A drug manufac-
turer labeled a certain preparation as a medicine. In fact it was a
poison. The executor of a consumer brought suit for the death occa-
sioned by the negligence and recovered.2 7 The avoidance of the privity
objection involved two initial errors which oddly enough have not
only been overlooked but perpetuated. The case has always been
treated as if it were the manufacture and sale of a poison, that is,
one where the seller and buyer intended to deal in poison. Obviously
they did not. But if it is assumed that they did, the next step is even
stranger. It is that a poison being a very dangerous product, the
customer's protection requires a very high degree of care in its prepa-
ration. Nothing could be more in error. If the buyer believes he is
getting a deadly preparation, any fault in its compounding could only
serve to make it less dangerous. If lethal to start with, no error can
make it more so. What was really intended was that a manufacturer
whose products are such that negligent work will be likely to cause
great harm owes a duty to all who may suffer by that negligence.
23 Moriarty v. Porter, 22 Misc. 536, 49 N. Y. Supp. 1107 (City Ct., N. Y. Co.,
1898).
24 McVeigh v. Gentry, 72 App. Div. 598, 76 N. Y. Supp. 535 (2d Dept. 1902);
but only for those errors which are the result of negligence. Beckwith v. Oatman, 43
Hun 265 (N. Y. 1887).
25 Flynt v. Rightmeyer, 107 Misc. 692, 177 N. Y. Supp. 842 (Sup. Ct., Orange
Co., 1919); in fact proper advising can cure the negligence of improper labelling.
Wohlfart v. Beckert, 92 N. Y. 489 (1883), affirms 27 Hun 74 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1882).
26 Improper compounding is actionable. Goldberg v. Hegeman, 60 Misc. 107, 111
N. Y. Supp. 679 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. Co., 1908). So is a solution which corresponds with
the order but is stronger than customary. Horst v. Walter, 53 Misc. 591, 103 N. Y.
Supp. 750 (Sup. Ct., Bronx Co., 1907).
27 Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397 (1852).
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But this was not believed to be the holding and, though it did become
and is the law, that step was not taken for many years. The recog-
nized import of the early case was that a dealer in the "engines of
death" owed such a duty, though it was followed in its error to in-
clude as an engine of death any preparation, no matter how innocent
if properly made, if a poison was introduced into it.2"
The requirement of privity was not overlooked. But it was con-
sciously obviated, as a departure from the general plan to be fol-
lowed under particular circumstances and in accord with certain
reasoning. It was always felt that where the probable outcome of
negligence was death, there should be liability. And the potentiality
of death is not a frequent topic of discussion in cases where the basis
of liability was not till then well founded." In the face of this emi-
nently proper outlook it became necessary for privity to either jus-
tify its utility or disappear from the law. The justification was real,
even though the thing justified was theoretical. A manufacturer is
at a tremendous disadvantage in a suit by a consumer. He has no
information as to the accident and is rarely in a position to contest
its happening. He is also at a loss to contest the condition of the
article. He cannot know how it has been treated by the intermediate
dealers and it is hardly to be expected that they will come to his
rescue at the expense of themselves. As so many articles are manu-
factured in large quantities, it is virtually impossible to identify the
steps taken in manufacture and inspection of the particular specimen
involved. The manufacturer is relegated to a description of his usual
processes, which is generally not a convincing presentation. These
hardships would not escape the eyes of the fraudulent. And the law
was wary of providing a forum for frauds which it could not
generally detect. But the "engine of death" manufacturers were not
in this position. Injury as a consequence of their negligence would
28 Taintor v. Beseler, 33 Misc. 720, 68 N. Y. Supp. 980 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. Co.,
1901), aff'd, 62 App. Div. 617, 71 N. Y. Supp. 1149 (1st Dept. 1901). The product
in this case was oxygen. Maher v. Clairol, Inc., 263 App. Div. 848, 31 N. Y. S. 2d
751 (2d Dept. 1941).
29 See Smith v. New York and Harlem R. R., 19 N. Y. 127 (1859); Colegrove v.
N. Y. & N. H. R. R., and N. Y. & Harlem R. R., 20 N. Y. 492 (1859), affirming 6
Duer 382 (N. Y. Super. Ct., 1857). Conversely, where liability is not to be extended,
the unlikelihood of causing death is stressed. See McMillen v. Edison Ill. Co., 13
Misc. 392, 34 N. Y. Supp. 248 (City Ct. of Brooklyn, 1895). These phrases are no
longer popular with opinion writers. The modem substitute for describing the same
situation and justifying the same course is "inherently dangerous." Parsan v. John-
son, 208 N. Y. 337, 101 N. E. 879 (1913).
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be the expected rather than the unusual. Greater precaution necessi-
tated in the process of manufacturing would facilitate proof of care.
These distinctions, while not overcoming the objections to liability
of manufacturers generally, at least put these manufacturers on a
different plane. And as to them, privity was therefore removed as a
disqualification of the plaintiff. As was noted, the considerations
which brought this about apply with equal, if not greater, cogency to
a manufacturer whose product, innocent in itself, carried the like-
lihood of danger if negligently made than to one who made bombs,
rifles, dynamite or poisons. And so the law was fixed. The articles
included are described as "imminently" or "inherently" dangerous.
This being the principle, a short review of the developments pur-
suant to it would not be out of place. As to any person except the
customer, a retailer is not in privity and he owes a duty to such
other person only if the article sold is in the dangerous class.30 Danger
refers to unsuspected qualities but any ordinary article of commerce,
hiot defective, may be sold to anyone, even a child. 1 One who repre-
sents himself to be the manufacturer is under the same responsibility
as the real manufacturer.32 A manufacturer who incorporates the
products of another in his own is under a duty to inspect and test
them. 3 A jobber who puts his name on the article has a duty to in-
spect for defects. 4 Of course, these obligations apply only to danger-
ous articles. 5 Even with dangerous articles there is no responsibility
if injury results from a use different from that for which the article
was intended."6 And even this class of article is not supposed to last
30 Dewar v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 49 N. Y. S. 2d 654 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co., 1944).
If so, even if the sale is illegal, he is liable. Bolivar v, Mounat, 232 App. Div. 33,
248 N. Y. Supp. 722 (4th Dept. 1931), 135 Misc. 446, 238 N. Y. Supp. 616 (Sup. Ct.,
Lewis Co., 1929).
31 Traynor v. United Cigars Whelan Stores Corp., 274 App. Div. 800, 79 N. Y. S.
2d 329 (2d Dept. 1948). The article was lighter fluid and stated in this connection
not inherently dangerous.
32 Commissioners of St. Ins. F. v. City C. H. Corp., 290 N. Y. 64, 48 N. E. 2d
262 (1943).
33 McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916), affirms
153 App. Div. 474, 138 N. Y. Supp. 224 (3d Dept. 1912).
34 Willson v. Faxon, Williams & Faxon, 208 N. Y. 108, 101 N. E. 799 (1913),
138 App. Div. 359, 117 N. Y. Supp. 361 (1909), 63 Misc. 561, 117 N. Y. Supp.
361 (Sup. Ct., Erie Co., 1909). Loss of service action on facts, 138 App. Div. 366,
122 N. Y. Supp. 783 (4th Dept. 1910); Miller v. Steinfeld, 174 App. Div. 337, 160
N. Y. Supp. 800 (3d Dept. 1916).
35 Bruckel v. Milhau's Sons, 116 App. Div. 832, 102 N. Y. Supp. 395 (2d Dept.
1901).
36 Favo v. Remington Arms Co., 67 App. Div. 414, 73 N. Y. Supp. 788 (3d Dept.
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indefinitely, so that a defect resulting from normal wear and tear is
not actionable.
3 7
As to what is imminently or inherently dangerous, it is pretty
nearly anyone's guess. Aside from some things which are fairly defi-
nitely in the one classification or the other, all that the student or
practitioner can do is to seek an analogy from the reported decisions.
As an example, the following have been held to be dangerous-
coffee urn,38 machine for removing superfluous hair,89 sanitary nap-
kin.40  These have been determined not dangerous-wagon wheel,
41
icebox, 2 bed, mattress," vacuum cleaner,4 5 metal nursing shield,4
decorative powder box,47 carbon dioxide capsule.4" An ordinary shoe
was held not dangerous where its heel was defective, and dangerous
where there was a nail in the last.49 As the test is the nature of the
article and not the manner in which injury can be inflicted, these
cases are irreconcilable.
1. Defective Bottles.-There is one article that is the subject of
two peculiar rules. That is the ordinarly bottle. It is conceivable that
a bottle can be defective in two ways-a flaw may cause it to burst
from pressure or its surface may be jagged. As to the first potentiali-
1901); Harper v. Remington Arms Co., 156 Misc. 53, 280 N. Y. Supp. 862 (Sup. Ct.,
N. Y. Co., 1935), aff'd without opinion, 248 App. Div. 713, 290 N. Y. Supp. 130 (1st
Dept. 1936).
37 Auld v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 261 App. Div. 918, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 491 (2d Dept.
1941), aff'd, 288 N. Y. 515, 41 N. E. 2d 927 (1942).
38 Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co., 195 N. Y. 478, 88 N. E. 1063 (1909), reversing 125
App. Div. 69, 109 N. Y. Supp. 172 (4th Dept. 1908).
39 Pariser v. Wappler Elec. Co., Inc., 145 Misc. 315, 260 N. Y. Supp. 35 (Sup.
Ct., N. Y. Co., 1932).
40 La Frumento v. Kotex Co., 131 Misc. 314, 226 N. Y. Supp. 750 (City Ct.,
N. Y. Co., 1928).
41 Loop v. Litchfield, 42 N. Y. 351 (1870).
42 Swan v. Jackson, 55 Hun 194 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1889).
43 Field v. Empire Case Goods Co., 179 App. Div. 253, 166 N. Y. Supp. 509
(2d Dept. 1917).
44 Jasonies v. Hasselbarth, 223 App. Div. 182, 228 N. Y. Supp. 302 (3d Dept.
1928).
45 Galvin v. Lynch, 137 Misc. 126, 241 N. Y. Supp. 479 (City Ct, of N. Y., 1930).
46 Cleary v. Mars Co., 173 Misc. 954, 19 N. Y. S. 2d 38 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co.,
1940).
47 Poplar v. Boarjois, Inc., 272 App. Div. 74, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 252 (1st Dept. 1947).
48 Mesick v. Polk, 296 N. Y. 673, 70 N. E. 2d 169 (1946), reversing 270 App.
Div. 900, 61 N. Y. Supp. 11 (2d Dept. 1946).
49 Cook v. Garside & Sons, Inc., 145 Misc. 577, 259 N. Y. Supp. 947 (Sup. Ct,
N. Y. Co., 1932); Sherwood v. Lax & Abowitz, 145 Misc. 578, 259 N. Y. Supp. 948
(Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co., 1932); Donahue v. Loeser & Co., 243 App. Div. 705, 277 N. Y.
Supp. 990 (2d Dept. 1935).
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ty, it is under certain circumstances dangerous; as to the second,
never.50 The other peculiarity is that there is only liability if the liquid
to be put in the bottle is likely to explode. If it is not, there is no liabili-
ty even if it does.5 If the liquid is subject to explode under certain con-
ditions, the bottle must be sufficiently strong to resist those condi-
tions.52 As a matter of fact, it appears that the art of bottle making
has not reached a stage where imperfections can be avoided so that the
real obligation is to inspect and make tests to eliminate the imperfect
specimens.5" The bottler-that is the person who produces the liquid
and bottles-is regarded as a manufacturing assembler. By the
rules above noted he also has the duty of inspecting and testing.54
These peculiarities are unfortunate in that they are logically irrecon-
cilable with the general rules on the subject and are perhaps the
result of unhappy wording rather than faulty reasoning. If the car-
bonated bottled drink or the inflammable cleaning fluid is specified
as the dangerous article and the liability of the bottle maker stated
to be what it is-the liability of the maker of a part of an article
dangerous when assembled-one of these peculiarities is reconciled
to the pattern. The result in the jagged edge case can also be brought
into line by the fortuitous circumstance that the bottle involved was a
milk bottle and so not in the dangerous class. It must be admitted
that this was not. the basis of the decisions.
2. Products for Consumption in the Dangerous Class.-All
products for human consumption are in the dangerous class. Where
the processing is reasonably allied to manufacturing, as in the pro-
duction of canned goods,55 baking 6 or tobacco products,57 the lia-
50 Cullen v. Renken Dairy Co., 247 App. Div. 742, 285 N. Y. Supp. 707 (2d Dept.
1936).
51 Licari v. Markotos, 110 Misc. 334, 180 N. Y. Supp. 278 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. Co.,
1920) ; Smolen v. Grand View Dairy, 276 App. Div. 854, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 382 (2d Dept.
1949).
52 Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., Inc., 259 N. Y. 292, 181 N. E. 576 (1932), 233
App. Div. 252, 251 N. Y. Supp. 708 (2d Dept. 1931).
53 Torgesen v. Schultz, 192 N. Y. 156, 84 N. E. 956 (1908).
54 Willey v. Mynderse, 165 App. Div. 620, 151 N. Y. Supp. 280 (3d Dept. 1915).
55 Singer v. Zabelin, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 962 (City Ct. of N. Y. 1941).
56 Ternay v. Ward Baking Co., 167 N. Y. Supp. 562 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. Co., 1917);
Freeman v. Schultz Bread Co, 100 Misc. 528, 163 N. Y. Supp. 696 (Mun. Ct., N. Y.
Co., 1917); Veiner v. Mager & Throne, 167 Misc. 338, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 918 (Mun. Ct.,
N. Y., Bronx Co., 1938).
57 Foley v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., Inc., 136 Misc. 468, 241 N. Y. Supp.
233 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co., 1930); Meditz v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., Inc., 167
Misc. 176, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 357 (City Ct. of N. Y., 1930).
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bility is the same as in manufacturing. The defects usually encoun-
tered are the presence of foreign matter. Though liability is limited
to such instances where that condition is due to the negligence of the
processor, 8 the mere presence is enough to establish a prima facie
case.59As regards infection of the product, the packer, unless on notice
of the possibility, is only required to discover what an ordinary care-
ful inspection will reveal.6 0 A canner whose wares will suffer through
deterioration must advise on the label to what extent this is to be
expected.61 He must use containers safe for the product if such are
procurable.62 In regard to these products the restaurateur03 and the
local market man" occupy the place of the retailer, with the conse-
quence of responsibility for the condition of the merchandise at the
time of serving or sale.65
3. Effect of Advertising on Manufacturer's Liability.-Adver-
tising by a manufacturer has an effect on his liability. The adver-
tisements which have come before the courts are statements made on
wrappers or labels, but it is conceivable that any other advertising
would have the same effect. The rule in regard to it is that the arti-
cle must be equal to the claims made for it, and that quite regardless
of defect or negligence in the manufacture.6 6 If injury results from
58 Chysky v. Drake Brothers Co., 235 N. Y. 468, 139 N. E. 576 (1923), revers-
ing 200 App. Div. 864, 192 N. Y. Supp. 920 (1st Dept. 1922), 192 App. Div. 186,
182 N. Y. Supp. 459 (1st Dept. 1920); Cohen v. Dugan Bros., 132 Misc. 896, 230
N. Y. Supp. 743 (Sup. Ct., Bronx Co., 1928).
59 Cook v. Peoples Milk Co., 90 Misc. 34, 152 N. Y. Supp. 465 (Sup. Ct., Erie
Co., 1915).
60 Dressier v. Merkel, Inc., 247 App. Div. 300, 284 N. Y. Supp. 697 (2d Dept.
1936), aft'd, 272 N. Y. 574, 4 N. E. 2d 744 (1936); Lucey v. Harstedt, 270 App. Div.
900, 61 N. Y. S. 2d 157 (2d Dept. 1946).
61 Rosenbusch v. Ambrosia Milk Corp., 181 App. Div. 97, 168 N. Y. Supp. 505
(1st Dept. 1917).
62 Hallenbeck v. Wander & Sons Chemical Co., Inc., 197 App. Div. 855, 189 N. Y.
Supp. 334 (3d Dept. 1921).
63 Rosenswaike v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 175 N. Y. Supp. 828 (Sup.
Ct., N. Y. Co., 1919).
6 Ganoung v. Reeves, Inc., 149 Misc. 515, 268 N. Y. Supp. 325 (Mun. Ct., X. Y.
Co., 1933).
65 Kelly v. Wegman's Food Markets, Inc., 262 App. Div. 687, 31 N. Y. S. 2d
976 (4th Dept. 1941); Jacobs v. Childs Co., 166 N. Y. Supp. 798 (Mun. Ct., N. Y.
Co., 1916).
66 Crist v. Art Metal Works Nos. 1 & 2, 230 App. Div. 114, 243 N. Y. Supp.
496 (1st Dept. 1930); Henry v. Crook, 202 App. Div. 19, 195 N. Y. Supp. 642 (3d
Dept. 1922); the same rule applies where the manufacturer purports to list the
ingredients of his product and if there is a variance between the list and the fact and
injury is traceable to this variance; Bundy v. Ey-Tab, Inc., 160 Misc. 325, 289 N. Y.
Supp. 905 (City Ct. of N. Y., Trial Term, Kings Co., 1935).
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use of it and it is shown that the article does not meet those claims,
a basis for recovery is established. This amounts to fixing a tort lia-
bility on a warranty of safety, not a warranty of careful workmanship
but a warranty of the nature of the article. As a warranty always
depended on privity, it is not easy to see how this should be. For
some time it has been unquestioned that a manufacturer who delib-
erately concealed a defect in his product was liable to an ultimate
consumer for an injury suffered thereby.6" When this was decided, it
was upon the basis of the action being in deceit. But when closer
examination of the grounds of liability was directed to the question,
the determination was reached that such an action is not in fraud but
in negligence.6 As this determination is undoubtedly correct, the
necessary conclusions are, first, that misrepresentation or concealment
can be the basis of an action for injuries, and that in such a case the
requirement of privity may be in some instances waived. That waiver
has been seen to be a not inconsiderable factor in negligence litigation.
Having established liability where there is negligence in manu-
facture or where the article is not as safe as the claims made for it,
the next step was to impose liability where neither of these facts
appeared. The article was a ladies' dress, certainly not dangerous.
It was well made and there was no advertising. But the material of
which it was made was more than usually inflammable and there was
an accident. According to all previous standards this accident was
not actionable. But it resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff on the
ground that the manufacturer owed a duty to buyers to warn them
of an inherently dangerous condition in the article.69 Obviously the
defendant was not negligent in using the material, because if he were,
his duty would not have been to warn but to forego the use. To estab-
lish negligence it would have, at least, to be shown that he knew or
should have known of the character of the material. This was ig-
nored. As was also the fact that here was a warranty of safety
through suitability to an ultimate purchaser with whom defendant had
no contract. Nor has he a reasonable opportunity to warn people
whom he will never see. If his duty is to warn retailers, a whole series
67 Kuelling v. Lean Mfg. Co., 183 N. Y. 78, 75 N. E. 1098 (1905), reversing 88
App. Div. 309, 84 N. Y. Supp. 622 (4th Dept. 1903).
68 Tulloch v. Haselo, 218 App. Div. 313, 218 N. Y. Supp. 139 (3d Dept. 1926).
Here the statute of limitations had run against an action for injuries but not against
an action for fraud. The action was held barred.
69 Moss v. Fred Perlberg, Inc., 29 N. Y. S. 2d 922 (Sup. Ct., X. Y. Co., 1941).
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of complications will arise. Not only was privity ignored but a vast
field of liability was opened by removing the barrier.
D. CONTRACTS OTHER THAN SALES CONTmACTS.-In addi-
tion to sales there are other contracts where the same or nearly
the same rules apply. One of these is where a device or appliance
is supplied under a lease or some other arrangement. 70 This situ-
ation comes up frequently on construction jobs, in stevedoring, 71
and in railroading. Often one contractor will agree to supply a scaffold,
ropes or other material for another, or the owner of the premises may
do it. In transportation, connecting railroads make agreements for
the use of equipment or a shipper may provide for the loan of his
freight cars. In all these situations there is privity between the two
parties to the transaction but none between the workmen of the re-
cipient and the provider. Most of the things in this category have
been found to be dangerous-scaffold, 72 drydock, 3 railroad switch,7
and a ladder. 75 The following were not-a coal car7" and a boiler.77
70 These cases should be carefully distinguished from those where an employer
supplies his own men. There the obligation is to supply safe articles and the nature
of the article, dangerous or not, has no bearing. Christian v. State of New York, 10
St. Dept. R. 132 (N. Y. Ct. Cl. 1916). And from those that hold a tacit permission
to use the article is not supplying. Williams v. First National Bank, 118 App. Div.
555, 102 N. Y. Supp. 1031 (4th Dept. 1907).
71 In cases where a stevedore is involved if the appliance is part of the ship,
the question is not presented due to the obligation of the shipowner to maintain all
parts of the ship in safe condition for the benefit of all who rightfully come in contact
with them. Smith v. Luckenbach, 155 App. Div. 481, 140 N. Y. Supp. 292 (2d Dept.
1913).
72 Coughtry v. Globe Woolen Co., 56 N. Y. 124 (1874), reversing 1 T. & C.
452 (Sup. Ct., 1873); Devlin v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 470, 11 Abb. N. C. 322 (1882). There
is a wealth of law on scaffolds and sidewalk bridges and they have been treated by
more than one statute. The cases above are early decisions before the particular ques-
tion became extremely complicated by virtue of the fellow servant rule and the remedial
decisions and statutes. Today the question of danger is not raised. Control and negli-
gence in maintenance are the most significant. Staslukiewicz v. Marcus Contracting Co.,
225 App. Div. 54, 232 N. Y. Supp. 160 (1st Dept. 1928); Van Wagenen v. Kemp,
7 Hun 328 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1876).
73 Cook v. The President etc. of the N. Y. Floating Dry Dock Co., I Hilt. 436
(N. Y. C. P., 1857).
74 Stodder v. N. Y. Le. & W. R. R., g0 Hun 221 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1888). aff'd
without opinion 121 N. Y. 655, 24 N. E. 1092 (1890).
75 Cassin v. Stillman Delehanty Ferris Co., 232 N. Y. 325, 133 N. E. 906 (1921),
reversing 192 App. Div. 965, 182 N. Y. Supp. 782 (2d Dept. 1920); 185 App. Div.
63, 172 N. Y. Supp. 754 (2d Dept. 1918).
76 Wright v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 40 Hun 343 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1886).
77 Losee v. Clute, 81 N. Y. 494 (1873). This looks like a peculiar holding and
the opinion went on the untenable ground that once the boiler was accepted liability
to third.persons ended.
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There are decisions both ways on ropes,78 and while a derrick was
stated to be dangerous in a case in which it was found that the par-
ticular derrick was not defective,79 a very similar device, a boom, was
held not to be dangerous.8" While the principles of these cases accord
with the sales cases, there are two differences in emphasis or degree
due to the factual differences. As the articles are seldom new and are
generally subject to rough usage, there is greater emphasis on the
necessity of showing that the defect complained of existed at the time
the supplier turned it over.8 Further, the waiver of privity is not for
the benefit of the public generally but only for those who will be ex-
pected to use or come in contact with the article.82 Thirdly, the per-
son supplied does not stand in the relation of a retailer. Except on
some other basis (as supplying a safe place to work for his own em-
ployees), he has no liability in connection with the article.8" But, odd-
ly enough, a third person who induced the plaintiff to use the device
on the representation that it was safe was held liable.84 Just how a
tort liability can be spelled out on a gratuitous guaranty is not imme-
diately apparent.
Even if the article supplied is in good condition, if instructions
as to its use are required or if the method of packing renders it dan-
gerous unless expertly handled, there is a duty to warn of these con-
ditions.85 The duty is performed if the information is given to the
person supplied,88 the supplier being entitled to rely on his passing
it on to the persons who would be affected. This is an odd instance
78 Rooney v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 10 Daly 241 (N. Y. C. P.,
1881) ; Connors v. King Line, Ltd., 98 App. Div. 261, 90 T. Y. Supp. 652 (2d Dept.
1904); Connors v. Great Northern Elevator Co., 90 App. Div. 311, 85 N. Y. Supp. 644
(4th Dept. 1904) (dangerous); Burke v. De Castro, 11 Hun 354 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.,
1877) (not dangerous).
75 Davis v. Pelham Hod Elevating Co., 65 Hun 573 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1892).
80 Freel v. Chrome Steel Works, 114 App. Div. 916, 100 N. Y. Supp. 1123 (2d
Dept. 1906).
81 Finan v. Valvoline Oil Co., 51 Misc. 292, 100 N. Y. Supp. 1087 (Sup. Ct.,
Orange Co., 1906); Coleman v. Guidonet Sons, 192 App. Div. 120, 182 N. Y. Supp.
625 (2d Dept. 1920).
82 Mauer v. Ferguson, 17 N. Y. Supp. 349 (City Ct., Brooklyn, 1892).
83 Barrett v. The Singer Mfg. Co., 1 Sweeny 545 (N. Y. Super. Ct., 1869);
Potter v. Seymour, 4 Bosw. 140 (N. Y. Super. Ct., 1859); Butler v. Townsend, 126
X. Y. 105, 26 N. E. 1017 (1891); Bohan v. Metropolitaxx Express Co., 122 App. Div.
590, 107 N. Y. Supp. 530 (1st Dept. 1907).
84 Fort v. Whipple, 11 Hun 586 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1877).
85 Sider v. General Elec. Co., 203 App. Div. 443, 197 N. Y. Supp. 98 (4th Dept.
1922); Rosebruck v. General Elec. Co., 236 N. Y. 227, 190 N. E. 571 (1923).
88 Sagler v. Kellogg Steamship Corp., 155 Misc. 217, 277 N. Y. Supp. 792 (Sup.
Ct., Kings Co., 1934).
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of a duty not being coextensive with a liability but it is obviously
grounded in good sense. Ordinarily the supplier has no responsibility
for the manner in which the device is operated.87 But if he supplies
an operator, he is, under familiar rules, responsible for his acts,"8
at least to the extent that the person supplied does not supersede him
in control of the operator's actions.89
A situation which is not supplying but akin to it arises where
there are several contractors on a job. None of these owes any
duty to any other or the workmen of any other for how his work
is done. That does not mean that if contractor A's employee drops
a brick on B's employee, A is not liable-he is.0° But if A's perform-
ance of his contract results in a negligent piece of work, no one but
the other party to A's contract can complain. However, if B's con-
tract calls for work on the base which A has built and due to A's
negligence this base is dangerous and B's man is hurt, he can recover
from A.91
Contracts to repair a mechanism92 or to install a deviceP3 are in
87 Ryan v. Wilson, 87 N. Y. 471, affirming 13 3. & S. 273 (N. Y. Super Ct., 1879).
88 Coyle v. Pierrepont, 37 Hun 379 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1885), 33 Hun 311 (N. Y.
Sup. Ct., 1884); Ramsey v. New York Cent. R. R., 269 N. Y. 219, 199 N. E. 65
(1935).
89 Wylie v. Palmer, 137 N. Y. 248, 33 N. E. 381 (1893); Quinn v. National Sugar
Ref. Co., 102 App. Div. 47, 92 N. Y. Supp. 95 (2d Dept. 1905); Van Deusen v. Riehtz
Pike E. & C. Corp., 238 App. Div. 178, 264 N. Y. Supp. 395 (3d Dept. 1933); Burton
v. American Bridge Co., 273 App. Div. 792, 75 N. Y. S. 2d 605 (2d Dept. 1947);
Elliott v. Flushing Sand & Stone Co., 273 App.!Div. 782, 75 N. Y. S. 2d 662 (2d Dept.
1947). The issue in this situation is whether the operator continues in the employ of
the supplier or becomes the ad hoc servant of the lessee. The decisions seem to follow
no pattern, even going to the extent of holding that a general employee of the lessee
is an ad hoc servant of the supplier. Cammisa v. Zone Oil Trucking Corp., 269 App.
Div. 785 (2d Dept. 1945). There is no excuse for such a holding but the explanation
is that if otherwise held, the plaintiff would be relegated to compensation.
90 Monahan v. Eidlitz, 59 App. Div. 224, 69 N. Y. Supp. 335 (1901). It has been
held that he is not required to do his work any differently because the other contrac-
tor's men are there. Garthwohl v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 116 App. Div. 176, 101
N. Y. Supp. 667 (1st Dept. 1906).
91 Clemens v. Benzenger, 211 App. Div. 586, 207 N. Y. Supp. 539 (4th Dept.
1925). But not from an intervening contractor who worked on B's case. Callam v.
Pugh, 54 App. Div. 543, 66 N. Y. Supp. 1118 (2d Dept. 1900).
92 Kahner v. Otis Elevator Co., 96 App. Div. 169, 89 N. Y. Supp. 185 (1st Dept.
1904); Kalinowski v. Truck Equipment Co., Inc., 237 App. Div. 472, 261 N. Y. Supp.
657 (4th Dept. 1933); Rosenfeld v. Smith & Sons, Inc., 180 App. Div. 691, 168 N. Y.
Supp. 214 (1st Dept. 1917).
93 Fish v. Waverly E. L. & Power Co., 189 N. Y. 336, 82 N. E. 150 (1907);
Casey v. Davis & Faber Machine Co., 209 N. Y. 24, 102 N. E. 523 (1913); Warner v.
Lucey, 207 App. Div. 241, 201 N. Y. Supp. 658 (3d Dept. 1923). The same is true if
the work done is to take down a machine for the purpose of sale. Pettis v. New
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the same category as contracts to supply. So' is a warehouseman
storing a dangerous article. He has been held liable after re-delivery
for damage caused by escaping gas from a tank which deteriorated
during storage. 4
Lastly is the instance when the defendant puts the article in cir-
culation but not through any channels of trade. He discards it, or
throws it away, or carelessly leaves it unguarded. If the article is
not dangerous, there is no liability95 and under these circumstances a
rather old-fashioned definition of "dangerous" is to be expected.9 6
If the plaintiff gets over this hurdle, he must also be ready to establish
that it was the defendant's negligence that caused the accident, not
his own treatment of the article thereafter9 7 Negligence in this con-
nection requires knowledge by the defendant of the facts which make
the abandoned article dangerous. 9
III. ACTIONS TO ABATE PRIVATE NUISANCES
WE have noted that questions of privity are sometimes involved
in those actions which trace their origins back to the action to abate
a private nuisance.
A. WHERE THE PLAINTIFF IS AN ABUTTING OWNER.-As the
plaintiff in equity had to show damage to his personal interest, he
was of necessity an abutting owner or a neighbor of the defendant.
Otherwise the odors of the slaughterhouse or the noise from the ma-
chines did not have any particular effect on him. In the negligence
actions the word "privity" is seldom used because the problems have
been treated from the opposite viewpoint-the duty of the defendant
to the plaintiff rather than the right of the latter to complain. In
certain types of cases99 this is not true. Where the accident occurs on
York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 249 App. Div. 487, 293 N. Y. Supp. 91 (3d Dept.
1937).
V4 Margulies v. Denner, 185 Misc. 139, 56 N. Y. S. .2d 856 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co.,
1945). From all angles this case is surprising but it shows the extent of the holdings.
95 Beickert v. G. M. Laboratories, 242 N. Y. 168, 151 N. E. 195 (1926).
96 Morse v. Buffalo Tank Corp., 280 N. Y. 110, 19 N. E. 2d 981 (1939) (gaso-
line not dangerous).
97 Hall v. New York Telephone Co., 214 N. Y. 49, 108 N. E. 182 (1915).
98 Rosenfeld v. G. X. Mathews Co., Inc., 256 App. Div. 937, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 858 (2d
Dept. 1939).
99 This discussion does not apply to actions based on the dose proximity of de-
fendant's land to the highway or its previous character as public property where the
issue is whether the rules of the highway should be applied to it for one reason or
another. Corcoran v. Village of Peekskill, 108 N. Y. 151, 15 N. E. 309 (1888); Specht
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the defendant's land and the property is such that the public is ex-
cluded, the plaintiff must bring himself within the class to whom
the defendant owes a duty. The rule is that trespassers and mere
licensees are owed no duty to see that the property is safe.100 This
is another way of saying that unless the plaintiff shows a right to
complain, he is barred and his right depends on his relationship to
the defendant. In other words, to recover he must show that he is
in privity with the defendant. Even those rightfully there and to
whom the owner in possession owes a duty (such as his employees)
must show a right to be in the particular part of the premises where
the accident happened." 1 As far as employees are concerned, the
right to recover arose within the framework of the fellow servant
rule and is hedged about with its restrictions.102 A tacit invitation is
enough to invoke the duty."0 3 In the case of children this seems to
have been rather overdone. It has been held that if defendant knows
they come to play on his land, he owes them a duty to see that it is
safe.1°  This is tantamount to saying that otherwise he is bound to
drive them away-a rather odd burden.
B. ACCIDENTS ON THE PuBLIc HIGHWAYS.-Suits for acci-
dents on the public highways arising out of nuisances present no ques-
tions of privity as far as the relationship of the plaintiff to the acci-
dent is concerned. There was a time, in analogy to the right to abate
v. Waterbury Co., 70 Misc. 404, 127 N. Y. Supp. 137 (Sup. Ct., Ktngs Co., 1911);
Collentine v. City of New York, 279 N. Y. 119, 17 N. E. 2d 792 (1938).
100 Heskell v. Auburn L. H. & P. Co., 209 N. Y. 86, 102 N. E. 540 (1913);
Meyer v. Pleschkopf, 251 App. Div. 166, 295 N. Y. Supp. 341 (1st Dept. 1937); Car-
bone v. Mackuhil Realty Corp., 296 N. Y. 154, 71 N. E. 2d 447 (1947), reversing 270
App. Div. 778, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 529 (3d Dept. 1946) ; Albert v. City of New York, 75
App. Div. 553, 78 N. Y. Supp. 355 (Ist Dept. 1902); Palladino v. Onondaga County
Savings Bank, 162 Misc. 726, 295 N. Y. Supp. 583 (Sup. Ct., Onondaga Co., 1937);
Wasmer v. Town of Brant, 222 App. Div. 711, 225 N. Y. Supp. 242 (4th Dept. 1927);
Avery v. Morse, 149 Misc. 318, 267 N. Y. Supp. 210 (Sup. Ct., Tompkins Co., 1933).
101 Connell v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. R., 144 App. Div. 664, 129 N. Y.
Supp. 666 (2d Dept. 1911); Walker v. Gleason, 109 App. Div. 791, 96 N. Y. Supp.
843 (2d Dept. 1905).
102 Mickee v. Wood Mowing Machine Co., 77 Hun 559 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 3d Dept.
1894) ; Flynn v. Harlow, 29 3. & S. 293 (N. Y. 1892).
103 Dorsey v. Chautauqua Institution, 203 App. Div. 251, 196 N. Y. Supp. 798
(4th Dept. 1922).
104 Bowers v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 282 N. Y. 442, 23 N. E. 2d 970
(1940) ; Petersen v. Crawford, 263 App. Div. 617, 34 N. Y. S. 2d 91 (1st Dept.
1942). Although it may be noted that instances of this are getting rarer and it has
now been both held and said that knowledge of playing is not the equivalent of an
invitation to play. Donahue v. Erie County Savings Bank, 258 App. Div. 1, 15 N. Y.
S. 2d 689 (4th Dept. 1939).
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a public nuisance, when the plaintiff's right to sue the municipality
was questioned. But that day has long since passed. There was never
any question where the nuisance" 5 was created by an individual.
That does not mean that these cases do not present questions. There
are the usual questions of whether there is negligence and what the
exact duty is."0 8 And also whether the defendant is in privity with
the accident. If the nuisance is in connection with a use of the road-
way (as a coal hole or other appurtenance of a building), the person
in possession of the building is naturally privy to it.1 7 If the danger
results from a condition prior to leasing, the owner is also liable. 08
Otherwise he is not.' If the danger results from work done on the
highway, the contractor is naturally liable.110 The owner or the per-
son ordering the work is not liable for the manner in which it is
done11' but is responsible for protecting users of the highway from the
effects of the work." 2
C. VARIOUS CLASSIFICATIONS OF LIAnBiTY.-The early restric-
tions have been adapted to modem conditions only by classifying lia-
bility in rather strict compartments. Thus the duties of the owner out
of possession are distinct. There are further distinctions as to the
outside of the premises and the inside, public buildings and private,
leased portions and those under control. Some of these rules are
familiar, others less readily called to mind. As far as they illustrate
105 The word is used to describe a lasting dangerous or forbidden condition. At
one time the distinction in the cause of action was significant. Jorgenson v. Minister of
Reformed Low Dutch Church, 7 Misc. 1, 27 N. Y. Supp. 318 (N. Y. C. P., 1894). But
not today.
108 Ster v. Tuety, 45 Hun 49 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1887); Nelson v. McMullen Snare
& Trieste, Inc., 184 App. Div. 900, 170 N. Y. Supp. 1099 (2d Dept. 1918).
107 Hughes v. Orange County Milk Ass'n, 56 Hun 396 (N Y. Sup. Ct., 1890);
Niehau v. Caryfield, Inc., 240 App. Div. 144, 269 N. Y. Supp. 335 (1st Dept. 1934);
Kleinmeier v. State of New York, 10 St. Dept. R. 113 (N. Y. Ct. Cl., 1916). Liability
is confined to defects. To recover for cellar doors being left open, etc., negligence in
so doing must be proved. Ornstein v. Unterman, 159 N. Y. Supp. 636 (Sup. Ct., App.
Term, 1st Dept. 1916); Kirby v. Newman, 239 N. Y. 470, 147 N. E. 69 (1925); Kelly
v. Smity, 29 App. Div. 346, 51 N. Y. Supp. 413 (1st Dept. 1898). In certain situations
proof may be by way of res ipsa. Miners v. Ausfresser, 101 Misc. 394, 157 N. Y. Supp.
17 (Sup. Ct., App. Term, 1st Dept. 1917), reversing 99 Misc. 236, 165 N. Y. Supp. 69
(City Ct. N. Y., 1917).
108 Hartman v. Lowenstein, 90 Misc. 686, 154 N. Y. Supp. 205 (Sup. Ct., App.
Term, 1st Dept. 1915).
109 Holland v. Levy, 189 N. Y. Supp. 77 (Sup. Ct., App. Term, 1st Dept. 1921).
110 Peard v. Kardt, 56 Hun 649, 10 N. Y. Supp. 463 (1st Dept. 1890).
111 Koch v. Fox, 71 App. Div. 288, 75 N. Y. Supp. 913 (1st Dept. 1902).
112 The distinction is not always easy or well made. Rock v. Radice Elec. Co.,
Inc., 131 Misc. 51, 22 .N. Y. Supp. 659 (Sup. Ct., App. Term, 1st Dept. 1927).
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the general proposition under discussion, they will be set out. For
the sake of brevity "lessor" will refer to one who has leased the en-
tire premises. "Operator" will be used to describe one who rents out
portions of the premises. Taking first the subject of private build-
ings-that is those to which the public generally is not invited-the
lessor owes no duty in regard to them"' unless he knowingly allows
the tenant to make the premises dangerous" 4 or leases it for a pur-
pose for which he knows the building is not strong enough."13 As
regards the exterior, which includes all those portions to which the
public passing by the building will be exposed, he retains responsi-
bility for all defective conditions which existed at the time of his
leasing of which he had notice,116 and this is regardless of whether his
negligence caused the defect." 7 The complement is necessarily true-
he is not responsible for conditions which arose after his letting or of
which he was ignorant when he let the premises."" The same is true
13 Potter v. New York, 0. & W. R. Co., 261 N. Y. 489, 185 N. E. 708 (1933),
233 App. Div. 578, 253 N. Y. Supp. 394 (4th Dept. 1931).
114 Quigley v. Johns Mfg. Co., 26 App. Div. 434, 50 N. Y. Supp. 98 (2d Dept.
1898) ; Zolezzi v. Kroll & Horowitz, 216 App. Div. 719, 214 N. Y. Supp. 204 (2d Dept.
1926).
115 Edwards v. N. Y. & H. R. R. R., 98 N. Y. 245, 25 Hun 634 (Sup. Ct., 1885).
116 Timlin v. S. 0. Co., 126 N. Y. 514, 27 N. E. 786 (1891), reversing 54
Hun 44, 7 N. Y. Supp. 158 (Sup. Ct., 1889); Zolezzi v. McCaulis, 210 App. Div. 368,
206 N. Y. Supp. 330 (2d Dept. 1924); Brookins v. Hecht, 235 App. Div. 792, 256
N. Y. Supp. 985 (2d Dept. 1932); Hungerford v. Bent, 55 Hun 3, 8 N. Y. Supp. 614
(Sup. Ct., N. Y. Co., 1889); Mathews v. DeGroff, 13 App Div. 356, 43 N. Y. Supp.
237 (1st Dept. 1897). This liability is to the public, not to the tenant or one in rela-
tionship to him. Stein v. Pershing Square Bldg. Corp., 191 Misc. 30, 79 N. Y. S. 2d
417 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. Co., 1948)
117 McGrath v. Walker, 64 Hun 179 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1889). The rule is the same
as if he was in possession. Mullins v. Siegel Cooper Co., 95 App. Div, 234, 88 N. Y.
Supp. 737 (2d Dept. 1904).
118 Wolf v. Kilpatrick, 101 N. Y. 146, 4 N. E. 188 (1886); Dadson v. Dixon,
179 App. Div. 491, 165 N. Y. Supp. 694 (3d Dept. 1917); Leaux v. City of New York,
No. 1, 87 App. Div. 398, 184 N. Y. Supp. 514 (1st Dept. 1903); Stork v. Dorn, 212
App. Div. 522, 209 N. Y. Supp. 150 (1st Dept. 1925); Delaney v. N. Y. Polyclinic
Medical School, 69 Misc. 625, 126 N. Y. Supp. 94 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. Co., 1910); De-
Marco, v. Isaac, 74 Misc. 459, 132 N. Y. Supp. 363 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. Co., 1911);
Martin v. Petit, 117 N. Y. 118, 22 N. E. 566 (1889) ; Curran v. Flammer, 49 App. Div.
293, 62 N. Y. Supp. 1061 (1st Dept. 1900); Mitzroth v. City of New York, 212 App.
Div. 253, 208 N. Y. Supp. 744 (1st Dept. 1925); Dodd v. Rothschild, 31 Misc. 721,
65 N. Y. Supp. 214 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. Co., 1900); Mondelli v. Caputo, 174 N. Y. Supp.
625 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. Co., 1919); Elefante v. Pizitz, 182 App. Div. 819, 169 N. Y.
Supp. 210 (1st Dept. 1918); Heath v. Metropolitan Exhibition Co., 11 N. Y. Supp.
357 (Sup. Ct., 1st Dept. 1890); Black v. Maitland, 11 App. Div. 188, 42 N. Y. Supp.
653 (2d Dept. 1896); Vousden v. United Cities Realty Corp., 194 App. Div. 26, 184
N. Y. S. 763 (2d Dept. 1920). There are statutory exceptions to this, notably that
concerning window washers. But oddly enough liability to a window washer was held
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if he was never in possession.'19 An exception is where he leaves it
in such condition that, though temporarily safe, a slight change can
make it a source of danger. 2 Where the lessor is under no responsi-
bility, an agreement by him with the tenant to repair is immaterial.
The injured person cannot take advantage of it.'" But if he does re-
pair, even voluntarily, and is negligent, plaintiff can recover.'22 If
the negligent repair antedates the letting, even though in contempla-
tion of it, the other rules prevent recovery. 23 The tenant is respon-
sible for all conditions. 24 If he is on notice, it is immaterial whether
the condition arose during his tenancy 125 or prior to it. 26
The over-all picture presented by these conclusions is a rather
strict adherence to the requirements of privity. Particularly is this
apparent in the insignificance of a contract to repair. The way in
which such contracts have been summarily treated indicates an
awareness and an indorsement of the rules of privity.
D. THE OPERATOR AT COMMON LAw.-The position of the oper-
ator at common law was not materially different.
1. Privately-Owned Building.W bile he is in privity with his
tenants, privity does not in itself imply a duty.Y7 Premises, in the
absence of other agreement, being let "as is", he is only responsible
even before the statute for no discoverable reason. Fink v. 37 West 36th Street Co.,
251 App. Div. 261, 296 N. Y. Supp. 225 (1st Dept. 1937).
119 Woram v. Noble, 41 Hun 398 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 2d Dept. 1886).
120 Anderson v. Dickie, 1 Rob. 238, 26 How. Pr. 103 (N. Y. Super. Ct., 1863).
121 Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N. Y. 287, 176 N. E. 397 (1931), 231 App. Div. 266,
247 N. Y. Supp. 109 (4th Dept. 1931); Van Tassel v. Read, 36 App. Div. 529, 55
N. Y. Supp. 502 (2d Dept. 1899). There have been attempts to get around this rule.
If the agreement is contained in the lease it has been held that this shows that full
possession has not been transferred and the lessor has been held liable. May v. Ennis,
78 App. Div. 552, 79 N. Y. Supp. 896 (2d Dept. 1903).
122 Zeller v. Cook, 62 Misc. 471, 115 N. Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. Ct., 1st Dept. 1909);
Blake v. Fox, 17 N. Y. Supp. 508 (Ct. C. P., 1892).
123 Lenitsky v. Union Dime Savings Bank, 261 App. Div. 977, 27 N. Y. S. 2d
997 (2d Dept. 1941).
124 Irvin v. Wood, 51. N. Y. 224 (1872), affirms 4 Rob. 138 (N. Y. Super. Ct., N. Y.
Co., 1866); Walkowicz v. Whitney's, Inc., 178 Misc. 331, 34 N. Y. S. 2d 175 (Sup. Ct.,
Monroe Co., 1942). Of course, that means all conditions that amount to negligence.
Kern v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 209 App. Div. 133, 204 N. Y. Supp. 402
(1st Dept. 1924).
125 Babbage v. Powers, 130 N. Y. 281, 29 N. E. 132, 4 Silv. 211 (Sup. Ct., 8th
Dept., 1889); Alperin v. Earle, 55 Hun 211 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1st Dept. 1889).
126 Abeam v. Steele, 115 N. Y. 203, 22 N. E. 193 (1889).
127 Reissman v. Jacobowitz, 22 Misc. 551, 49 N. Y. Supp. 1006 (N. Y. City Ct.,
1898). Auerbach v. Rabiner, 165 N. Y. Supp. 428 (App. Term, 1st Dept. 1917);
Stoecker v. Hearst, 89 Misc. 568, 153 N. Y. Supp. 752 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term, N. Y.
Co., 1915).
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for conditions that are concealed. 2 " For others, and for conditions
that arise during the tenancy in the absence of statute, he has no re-
sponsibility.12 9 Here also a contract to repair is unavailing. But not
because of privity-there is privity in those cases in which the lessee
is injured. The contract is unavailing because it has been ruled that
damages for injury are not a consequence that was contemplated as
the result of a breach. 30 The operator is responsible to those right-
fully on the premises or the adjoining area for conditions in those
parts of the building over which he has retained control,181 but not
128 Birke v. Pirwitz, 190 N. Y. Supp. 14 (Sup. Ct., Monroe Co., 1921); Ryan
v. State of New York, 192 Misc. 408, 77 N. Y. Supp. 764 (N. Y. Ct. Cl., 1948).
129 Franz v. Mulligan, 18 Misc. 411, 42 N. Y. Supp. 509 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term,
1896); Bruszaczynaska v. Ruby, 267 App. Div. 539, 47 N. Y. Supp. 788 (1st Dept.
1944); Kusheo v. Ginsberg, 99 App. Div. 417, 91 N. Y. Supp. 216 (1st Dept. 1904);
Sherlock v. Rushmore, 99 App. Div. 598, 91 N. Y. Supp. 152 (2d Dept. 1904); Fowner
v. Ogilvie, 49 Hun 229, 1 N, Y. Supp. 633 (Sup. Ct., Gen1 Term, 1st Dept. 1888);
Samuels v. A. M. Realty Co., 165 N. Y. Supp. 979 (Sup. Ct., App. Term, 1st Dept.
1917); Tauber v. Rochelsky, 90 Misc. 382, 153 N. Y. Supp. 199 (Sup. Ct., App. Term,
1st Dept. 1915); Goetchius v. Gale, 57 Misc. 192, 108 N. Y. Supp. 1079 (Sup. Ct., Spec.
Term, 1907); Kennedy v. Fay, 31 Misc. 776, 65 N. Y. Supp. 202 (Sup. Ct., App. Term,
1900); Silverman v. Isaac, 183 App. Div. 542, N. Y. S. 290 (1st Dept. 1918); Anton-
sen v. Bay Ridge Savings Bank, 266 App. Div. 164, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 629 (2d Dept.
1943) ; Smalley v. Syracuse Say. Bank, 36 N. Y. S. 2d 294 (Sup. Ct., Onondaga Co.,
1942) ; Areal v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 43 N. Y. S. 2d 538 (Sup. Ct., Osvego Co.,
1943) ; Kilmer v. White, 254 N. Y. 64, 171 N. E. 908 (1930). There is no exception
for structural defects. Kosior v. Pomerinse, 249 App. Div. 196, 219 N. Y. Supp. 830
(1st Dept. 1936); Beretta v. Schroeder, 256 App. Div. 840, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 421 (2d
Dept. 1939). But there is a tendency to hold that the landlord retains control over
most structural parts. Fleischer v. Dworsky, 90 Misc. 628, 153 N. Y. S. 951 (Sup. Ct.,
App. Term, 1st Dept., 1915).
130 Franz v. Mandel, 76 App. Div. 413, 78 N. Y. Supp. 855 (2d Dept. 1902);
Folsom v. Parker, 31 Misc. 348, 64 N. Y. Supp. 263 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co., 1900);
Miller v. Rinaldo, 21 Misc. 470, 47 N. Y. Supp. 636 (Sup. Ct., App. Term, 1897);
Sanders v. Smith, 5 Misc. 1, 25 N. Y. Supp. 125 (Sup. Ct., Broome Co., 1893);
Israel v. Tonkel, 134 Misc. 327, 235 N. Y. Supp. 285 (N. Y. City Ct., Bronx Co.,
1929); Schick v. Fleischauer, 26 App. Div. 210, 49 N. Y. Supp. 962 (1st Dept. 1898);
Weiss v. Valenstein, 79 Misc. 229, 139 N. Y. Supp. 851 (Sup. Ct., App. Term, 1st Dept.,
1913); Stelz v. Van Dusen, 93 App. Div. 358, 87 N. Y. Supp. 716 (2d Dept. 1904);
Schiff v. Pottlitzer, 51 Misc. 611, 101 N. Y. Supp. 249 (Sup. Ct., App. Term, 1906);
DeNegro v. Christman, 77 Misc. 147, 136 N. Y. Supp. 364 (Sup. Ct., App. Term, 1st
Dept. 1912); Cuehle v. Ackerman, 58 Misc. 538, 109 N. Y. Supp. 714 (Sup. Ct., App.
Term, 1st Dept. 1908); Conroy v. Scanlon, 158 Misc. 715, 286 N. Y. Supp. 492 (City
Ct. N. Y., Bronx Co., 1936); Boden v. Scholz, 101 App. Div. 1, 91 N. Y. Supp. 437
(2d Dept. 1905); Dancy v. Walz, 112 App. Div. 355, 98 N. Y. Supp. 407 (2d Dept.
1906); Spero v. Levy, 43 Misc. 24, 86 N. Y. Supp. 869 (Sup. Ct., App. Term, 1904);
Nagle v. Davies, 60 Misc. 479, 113 N. Y. Supp. 834 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term, 1908).
But in a cross-complaint for damages paid by the landlord against the tenant who con-
tracted to repair, it was held that the covenant contemplated such damages--if the re-
pair was in a part of the premises open to the public. McCreech v. Howard R. Ware
Corp., 184 Misc. 444, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 192 (Sup. Ct., West'r Co., 1945).
131 O'Sullivan v. Norwood, 14 Daly 286 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. Co., 1887); Helsen.
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in the parts which he has leased.132 As regards houses coming under
the Tenement House Law, this has been changed by statute. The
operator is responsible for conditions in leased portions of which he
has notice.13 3 As most leased dwellings, in cities certainly, come under
the provisions of this law, the resultant increase of actionable acci-
dents is incalculable. The first reaction of the courts was to resist this
tremendous influx. In line with that-liability was limited to the
realty, and devices in the apartment, even though leased, were treated
as at common law.'3 4
2. Public Buildings.-It is in regard to public buildings that
the propositions take on a greater interest and complexity. In this
connection "public" refers to buildings to which the public is invited
-theaters, stadia, grandstands and the like. As to these the lessor
owes a duty to see that all parts of the structure are in a safe condi-
tion for public use at the time of letting 33 and he owes it to all per-
sons who may visit it.'31  The owner has no liability for the acts of
back v. Guhring, 59 Hun 621, 12 N. Y. Supp. 792 (Sup. Ct., 1st Dept. 1890); Gold-
berg v. Engelhard, 146 Misc. 89, 261 N. Y. Supp. 568 (City Ct., Kings Co., 1933);
Henkell v. Munn, 31 Hun 28 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1884); Fraumberg v. Schmohl, 190 N. Y.
Supp. 710 (Sup. Ct., 1st Dept. 1921); Henry v. Frankfort, 252 App. Div. 538, 300
N. Y. Supp. 190 (2d Dept. 1937). At one time ideas of what was safe maintenance
were what was required by statute. As there was no statute on lighting halls, it was
held that this was unnecessary. Gorman v. White, 19 App. Div. 324, 46 N. Y. Supp.
1 (1st Dept. 1897); Muller v. Minken, 5 Misc. 444, 26 N. Y. Supp. 801 (N. Y. Super.
Ct., 1873).
132 Watts v. Fitzsimmons, 136 Misc. 647, 241 N. Y. Supp. 688 (Sup. Ct., 1st
Dept. 1930); Shillak v. White, 14 N. Y. Supp. 637 (City Ct. N. Y., 1891), aff'd 136
N. Y. 625, 32 N. E. 629 (1892); Statm v. Purroy, 170 App. Div. 584, 156 N. V.
Supp. 415 (2d Dept. 1915). If there is neglect in a controlled part which affects a
leased part causing injury, there is liability. Golub v. Pasinsky, 178 N. Y. 458, 70
N. E. 973 (1904), reversing 72 App. Div. 176, 76 N. Y. Supp. 388 (1st Dept. 1902).
133 Eckherdt v. Reichardt, 215 App. Div. 144, 213 N. Y. Supp. 62 (1st Dept.
1925).
134 Cooperman v. Anderson, 158 Misc. 155, 285 N. Y. Supp. 376 (City Ct. N. Y.,
Bronx Co., 1935); Boylan v. 1986 Grand Ave. Realty Corp., 169 Misc. 881, 8 N. Y.
S. 2d 200 (City Ct. N. Y., 1938).
135 Friedman v. Richman, 85 Misc. 376, 147 N. Y. Supp. 461 (Sup. Ct., 1st
Dept., 1864).
136 Junkerman v. Tilyou Realty Co., 213 N. Y. 404, 108 N. E. 190 (1915); Lusk
v. Peck, 132 App. Div. 426, 116 N. Y. Supp. 1051 (4th Dept. 1909), aff'd, 199 N. Y.
546, 93 N. E. 377 (1910); Barrett v. Lake Ontario Beach Imp. Co., 174 N. Y. 310,
66 N. E. 968 (1903), reversing 68 App. Div. 601, 74 N. Y. Supp. 301 (4th Dept.
1902); Lang v. Stadium Purchasing Corp., 216 App. Div. 558, 215 N. Y. Supp. 502
(1st Dept. 1926); Fox v. Buffalo Park, 21 App. Div. 321, 47 N. Y. Supp. 788 (4th
Dept. 1897); Connell v. Jankelson, 163 App. Div. 592, 148 N. Y. Supp. 992 (2d Dept.
1914). If the owner also operates the premises, this particular question is not present-
ed. Kasitch v. City of Albany, 259 App. Div. 17, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 140 (3d Dept. 1940).
The duty of an owner-operator of a public place seems to be different from that of a
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the tenant in giving the exhibition. 3 7 These provisions are grounded
in a fine recognition of things as they are. While such structures are
factually distinguishable from others, there seems to be no logical
legal principle on which the duty of the lessor can be distinguished.
Experience shows, however, that in many, though not in all, instances
the tenants are of a fly-by-night character, both literally and finan-
cially.1 38 For the purposes of redress the injured person who looks
to one of them frequently looks in vain. If he does succeed in getting
him into court, he can expect a verdict with confidence but a satisfied
judgment only rarely. In addition the leases are generally' so short
that it is only the exercise of fairness to put the burden on the owner
in such circumstances. 3 " The selection of the expression "public
building" as a word of art to define the structures intended was un-
fortunate and eventually it brought grief. The temptation to extend
the meaning to include all buildings which the usual meaning of the
word "public" might include was too great.140  And the rules were
person responsible for a private building as -regards maintenance. The latter must cor-
rect defects of which he has notice. Boss v. Jarmalowsky, 81 App. Div. 577, 81 N. Y.
Supp. 400 (1st Dept. 1903). The former has a duty to inspect to see that it is safe.
Riehl v. West Farms Tremont Corporation, 159 Misc. 800, 289 N. Y. Supp. 795 (City
Ct. N. Y., 1936). Somewhat related enterprises such as children's camps have the same
rule. Silverstein v. Camp David, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 6 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. Co., 1945). So
do amusement arcades. Goodacre v. Roovers Bros., Inc., 254 App. Div. 764, 4 N. Y.
S. 2d 591 (2d Dept. 1938). This rule has been questioned and its application limited
to instances of gradual deterioration. Nabson v. Mondal Realty Corp., 257 App. Div.
659, 15 N. Y. S. 2d 38 (1st Dept. 1939).
137 Cole v. Rome Savings Bank, 96 Misc. 188, 161 N. Y. Supp. 15 (Sup. Ct,
Oneida Co., 1916); Deyo v. Kingston Consol. R. R., 94 App. Div. 578, 88 N. Y. Supp.
514 (3d Dept. 1904). There are some borderline cases as to what constitutes providing
the place and what giving the exhibition. Concessions at country fairs generally
involve no specific lease of premises so the authorities are responsible for such matters
as roping off the space and generally protecting the public. Roper v. Ulster County
Agricultural Society, 136 App. Div. 97, 120 N. Y. Supp. 644 (3d Dept. 1909); Platt
v. Erie County Agricultural Society, 164 App. Div. 99 (4th Dept. 1914). But they are not
liable for acts within the concession. Oles v. Columbia County Agricultural Society,
236 App. Div. 569, 260 N. Y. Supp. 863 (3d Dept. 1932).
138 See Thomas v. Springer, 118 N. Y. Supp. 475 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co.f 1909), re-
versed on ground that this does not make the owner responsible for the acts of ushers.
134 App. Div. 253, 118 N. Y. Supp. 906 (2d Dept. 1909).
139 The tenat is also liable. Arnold v. State of New York, 163 App. Div. 253,
148 N. Y. Supp. 479 (3d Dept. 1914).
140 For quite some time the temptation was resisted and the rule maintained in
its original form. An unusual use of a building for a special occasion where a crow'd
resorted was not held to be public even for that occasion. Davis v. Schmitt Brothers,
Inc., 199 App. Div. 683, 192 N. Y. Supp. 15 (2d Dept. 1922). A pier was held not to
be public. Lafredo v. Bush Terminal Co., 261 N. Y. 323, 185 N. E. 398 (1933). So
was a factory. Liebowitz v. Denison Realty Corp., 250 App. Div. 204, 293 N. Y.
Supp. 867 (2d Dept. 1937).
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made to apply to business buildings to which persons other than the
tenant and his employees commonly resorted.14 For this there was
no reason. Tenants of such buildings as a class are of no less sta-
bility than the lessors. So the people who resort to them enjoy ample
protection. As a matter of fact, the plaintiff in the case in which the
extension was made was not such a person but an employee of the
tenant. He sued the lessor because as against the tenant he would
be relegated to Workmen's Compensation. It looks just a bit odd to
see a rule extended where the immediate purpose was to bypass a
statute so intrinsically an embodiment of the public policy of the
state.
Before leaving this field, it is interesting to note the duty of the
tenant of a public building to its patrons. Included within his duty to
maintain the building in safety is his duty to employ all feasible devices
to overcome expected hazards. 4 ' Here we get into questions of varia-
bles-what are feasible devices and expected hazards. At sporting
events there is generally some element of danger to the spectator from
the nature of the sport. This can only be avoided by putting the spec-
tator so far away or interposing such barriers that he cannot see what
is going on. Moreover, in most instances the spectator is quite aware
of the hazard and consciously takes the risk. Courts have generally
recognized this, especially in games where a ball is likely to be driven
in the seats, and recovery has been denied.143 But in other situations,
not materially dissimilar, it has been allowed.' 44 To have such a rule
is doubtless valuable to cover extreme cases of thoughtlessness on the
part of entrepreneurs but it is certain that it cannot be so limited.
People who seek thrills on roller coasters, toboggans or the like, are
subject to a more sensible rule. If the injury results from the danger
and not from any defect, they cannot recover.145 It is different if the
proprietor assures the public that the ride is safe. 46 This situation is
141 Campbell v. Elsie S. Holding Co., Inc., 251 N. Y. 446, 167 N. E. 582 (1929).
142 Freedman v. Clinton Court Corp., 167 Misc. 801, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 956 (City
Ct. of Rochester, 1937).
'43 Ingersol v. Onandaga Hockey Club, Inc., 245 App. Div. 137, 281 N. Y. Supp.
505 (3d Dept. 1935).
144 Redmond v. National Horseshow of America, Ltd., 78 Misc. 383, 138 N. Y.
Supp. 364 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. Co., 1912).
145 Connors v. Rockaway Whirlpool Co., 214 App. Div. 703, 210 N. Y. Supp.
205 (1st Dept. 1925); Lumsden v. Thompson Scenic Railway Co., 130 App. Div.
209, 114 N. Y. Supp. 421 (1st Dept. 1909). An assurance of safety is of no avail to a
tenant in regard to premises he rents. Cohn v. Home Title Ins. Co., 2 N. Y. S. 2d
245 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. Co., 1938).
146 Cunningham v. State, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 275 (Ct. Cl., 1942).
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virtually the same as the advertising cases considered under sales
of merchandise, and the applicable reasoning would be the same.
Here the reasons for the rulings are more obvious, the resultant rules
more workable, and it is hoped they will be adhered to. But a doubt
is evident from the treatment accorded people who participate in
sports at a place provided for them. These have demanded that they
be protected from their own negligence.'47 While their demands have
not yet been met, it is not inconceivable that they will be. If so,
the other situations will be made to accord.
E. RAILR OAD HIGHWAYS.-In one situation there has been a
total severance with the past as regards the necessity of privity in
negligence connected with realty. Railroads have frequently been re-
quired to build and maintain highways, as a condition of receiving
their franchises, and they are liable for injuries resulting from their
failure.14 Often this has been required for the benefit of particular
landowners whose existing roadway facilities have been interfered
with by the railroad. But anyone injured by a negligent failure to
maintain such a road may recover without regard to any connection
with the landowners in question.149
It has already been noted that questions of privity with the ac-
cident are swathed in a multitude of legal expressions which mean
"Did the defendant's negligence cause the accident?" Though these
phrases were perhaps employed to aid in answering the question, the
student will find that they serve mostly to confuse the issue. This
comes about because the situations are often unique and the answers
subjective. The result is that the decisions are often exciting and the
conclusions much as one would desire, but the attempts to justify the
steps taken to reach the conclusion are mostly unsatisfactory. In this
connection do we meet "proximate cause", the "but for" rule, "fore-
seeable consequence", and some lesser and shorter lived cliches. It
147 In Belkin v. Playdium, 194 Misc. 950, 87 N. Y. S. 2d 813 (City Ct. of Al-
bany, 1949), a bowler was injured. He claimed that the injury came about because he
was bowling in his stockinged feet. The asserted grounds of liability were that the
defendant proprietor should not have allowed him to do so. The decision was for
the defendant, because it was not established that bowling without shoes was negli-
gence. Suppose it had been-another bowler might have rights but not the plaintiff.
Placing the decision on the ground that it was rested on implied acceptance of the
plaintiff's theory that there is a duty to protect him from his own negligence.
148 Murphy v. Suburban Rapid Transit Co., 28 Jones & Sp. 9 (N. Y. Super. Ct.,
1891).
149 Harriman v. N. Y. C. & St. L. R. R., 253 N. Y. 398, 171 N. E. 686 (1930).
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is impossible to define these terms and their use merely emphasizes
an attempt to buttress a purely personal reaction by reference to
other purely personal reactions.*
* JusTicE STEUER'S article will be concluded in the September issue of the NEW
YoRx LAW FORI'm.
